Dialectical Materialism
Tarjei Straume (March 2nd, 2004):
Hi Peter,
I wrote:
>"You debate in a manner that is evasive in many ways,
sidetracking the
>issue raised by someone else by finding ways to revert
to your old
>worn-out repetitive polemical arguments about racism and
anti-Semitism."
Peter S:
>That's what I came here to talk about. This is not sidetracking
the issue,
>it is sticking to the issue.
Tarjei:
I'm talking about issues raised by others on this list, not
the issue
raised by yourself, which you seem to consider the only one
in focus. What I'm getting at is that is seems as if your
obsession with racism, anti-Semitism, and Nazism and your
tireless endeavor to smear anthroposophy with it may have
a deeper cause, namely that the anthroposophical epistemology
and world conception is offensive to dialectical materialists.
Peter Staudenmaier (March 2nd, 2004):
That doesn't make sense. I'm not a dialectical materialist,
and the parts of the anthroposophical world conception that
are "offensive" to me are precisely those parts
that I focus on here. I have lots of critical things to say
about anthroposophical epistemology (which, by the way, has
some significant dialectical elements), but I don't think
they have anything to do with Steiner's racial or ethnic doctrines,
thus I haven't addressed them here.
Daniel Hindes (March 3rd, 2004):
In thinking about things recently, I became aware that I
wasn't really clear on the meaning of Dialectical Materialism.
So I looked it up. The following is the definition from the
2002 Encyclopedia Britannica:
Dialectical Materialism
a philosophical approach to reality derived from the teachings
of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. For Marx and Engels, materialism
meant that the material world, perceptible to the senses,
has objective reality independent of mind or spirit. They
did not deny the reality of mental or spiritual processes
but affirmed that ideas could arise, therefore, only as products
and reflections of material conditions. Marx and Engels understood
materialism as the opposite of idealism, by which they meant
any theory that treats matter as dependent on mind or spirit,
or mind or spirit as capable of existing independently of
matter. For them, the materialist and idealist views were
irreconcilably opposed throughout the historical development
of philosophy. They adopted a thoroughgoing materialist approach,
holding that any attempt to combine or reconcile materialism
with idealism must result in confusion and inconsistency.
Marx's and Engels' conception of dialectics owes much to
G.W.F. Hegel. In opposition to the “metaphysical” mode
of thought, which viewed things in abstraction, each by itself
and as though endowed with fixed properties, Hegelian dialectics
considers things in their movements and changes, interrelations
and interactions. Everything is in continual process of becoming
and ceasing to be, in which nothing is permanent but everything
changes and is eventually superseded. All things contain
contradictory sides or aspects, whose tension or conflict
is the driving force of change and eventually transforms
or dissolves them. But whereas Hegel saw change and development
as the expression of the world spirit, or Idea, realizing
itself in nature and in human society, for Marx and Engels
change was inherent in the nature of the material world.
They therefore held that one could not, as Hegel tried, deduce
the actual course of events from any “principles of
dialectics”; the principles must be inferred from the
events.
The theory of knowledge of Marx and Engels started from
the materialist premise that all knowledge is derived from
the senses. But against the mechanist view that derives knowledge
exclusively from given sense impressions, they stressed the
dialectical development of human knowledge, socially acquired
in the course of practical activity. Individuals can gain
knowledge of things only through their practical interaction
with those things, framing their ideas corresponding to their
practice; and social practice alone provides the test of
the correspondence of idea with reality—i.e., of truth.
This theory of knowledge is opposed equally to the subjective
idealism according to which individuals can know only sensible
appearances while things-in-themselves are elusive, and to
the objective idealism according to which individuals can
know supersensible reality by pure intuition or thought,
independent of sense.
The concept of dialectical materialism—which is a
theoretical basis for a method of reasoning—should
not be confused with “historical materialism,” which
is the Marxist interpretation of history in terms of the
class struggle.
There exists no systematic exposition of dialectical materialism
by Marx and Engels, who stated their philosophical views
mainly in the course of polemics.
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