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Dialectical Materialism

Tarjei Straume (March 2nd, 2004):
Hi Peter,
I wrote:
>"You debate in a manner that is evasive in many ways, sidetracking the
>issue raised by someone else by finding ways to revert to your old
>worn-out repetitive polemical arguments about racism and anti-Semitism."
Peter S:
>That's what I came here to talk about. This is not sidetracking the issue,
>it is sticking to the issue.
Tarjei:
I'm talking about issues raised by others on this list, not the issue
raised by yourself, which you seem to consider the only one in focus. What I'm getting at is that is seems as if your obsession with racism, anti-Semitism, and Nazism and your tireless endeavor to smear anthroposophy with it may have a deeper cause, namely that the anthroposophical epistemology and world conception is offensive to dialectical materialists.

Peter Staudenmaier (March 2nd, 2004):
That doesn't make sense. I'm not a dialectical materialist, and the parts of the anthroposophical world conception that are "offensive" to me are precisely those parts that I focus on here. I have lots of critical things to say about anthroposophical epistemology (which, by the way, has some significant dialectical elements), but I don't think they have anything to do with Steiner's racial or ethnic doctrines, thus I haven't addressed them here.

Daniel Hindes (March 3rd, 2004):

In thinking about things recently, I became aware that I wasn't really clear on the meaning of Dialectical Materialism. So I looked it up. The following is the definition from the 2002 Encyclopedia Britannica:

Dialectical Materialism
a philosophical approach to reality derived from the teachings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. For Marx and Engels, materialism meant that the material world, perceptible to the senses, has objective reality independent of mind or spirit. They did not deny the reality of mental or spiritual processes but affirmed that ideas could arise, therefore, only as products and reflections of material conditions. Marx and Engels understood materialism as the opposite of idealism, by which they meant any theory that treats matter as dependent on mind or spirit, or mind or spirit as capable of existing independently of matter. For them, the materialist and idealist views were irreconcilably opposed throughout the historical development of philosophy. They adopted a thoroughgoing materialist approach, holding that any attempt to combine or reconcile materialism with idealism must result in confusion and inconsistency.
Marx's and Engels' conception of dialectics owes much to G.W.F. Hegel. In opposition to the “metaphysical” mode of thought, which viewed things in abstraction, each by itself and as though endowed with fixed properties, Hegelian dialectics considers things in their movements and changes, interrelations and interactions. Everything is in continual process of becoming and ceasing to be, in which nothing is permanent but everything changes and is eventually superseded. All things contain contradictory sides or aspects, whose tension or conflict is the driving force of change and eventually transforms or dissolves them. But whereas Hegel saw change and development as the expression of the world spirit, or Idea, realizing itself in nature and in human society, for Marx and Engels change was inherent in the nature of the material world. They therefore held that one could not, as Hegel tried, deduce the actual course of events from any “principles of dialectics”; the principles must be inferred from the events.

The theory of knowledge of Marx and Engels started from the materialist premise that all knowledge is derived from the senses. But against the mechanist view that derives knowledge exclusively from given sense impressions, they stressed the dialectical development of human knowledge, socially acquired in the course of practical activity. Individuals can gain knowledge of things only through their practical interaction with those things, framing their ideas corresponding to their practice; and social practice alone provides the test of the correspondence of idea with reality—i.e., of truth. This theory of knowledge is opposed equally to the subjective idealism according to which individuals can know only sensible appearances while things-in-themselves are elusive, and to the objective idealism according to which individuals can know supersensible reality by pure intuition or thought, independent of sense.

The concept of dialectical materialism—which is a theoretical basis for a method of reasoning—should not be confused with “historical materialism,” which is the Marxist interpretation of history in terms of the class struggle.

There exists no systematic exposition of dialectical materialism by Marx and Engels, who stated their philosophical views mainly in the course of polemics.



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